Self-organizing coalitions for managing complexity: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game theory models using dynamic social networks for interdisciplinary applications

por Burguillo, Juan C
Publicado 2017

Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization

por Domingos, Elias Fernández, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C., Kirchsteiger, Georg, Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom
Publicado 2020

Delegation to artificial agents fosters prosocial behaviors in the collective risk dilemma

por Fernández Domingos, Elias, Terrucha, Inês, Suchon, Rémi, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C., Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom
Publicado 2022