A first course on zero-sum repeated games

This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Sorin, Sylvain
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Berlin ; New York : Springer-Verlag, 2002.
Colección:Mathematiques & applications ; 37
Materias:
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Acceso en línea:http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=009793406&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Introduction and examples
  • 2. Games with incomplete information
  • 3. Repeated games with lack of information on one side
  • 4. Repeated games with lack of information on both sides
  • 5. Stochastic games
  • 6. Advances
  • App. A. Minmax theorems and duality
  • App. B. Approachability theory
  • App. C. Operators and repeated games
  • App. D. Kuhn's Theorem for repeated games.

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