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Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin...
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Lenguaje: | eng |
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Morgan & Claypool Publishers
2011
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Acceso en línea: | http://cds.cern.ch/record/1486597 |
_version_ | 1780926154275815424 |
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author | Chalkiadakis, Georgios Elkind, Edith Wooldridge, Michael |
author_facet | Chalkiadakis, Georgios Elkind, Edith Wooldridge, Michael |
author_sort | Chalkiadakis, Georgios |
collection | CERN |
description | Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representation |
id | cern-1486597 |
institution | Organización Europea para la Investigación Nuclear |
language | eng |
publishDate | 2011 |
publisher | Morgan & Claypool Publishers |
record_format | invenio |
spelling | cern-14865972021-04-22T00:16:46Zhttp://cds.cern.ch/record/1486597engChalkiadakis, GeorgiosElkind, EdithWooldridge, MichaelComputational Aspects of Cooperative Game TheoryMathematical Physics and Mathematics Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representationMorgan & Claypool Publishersoai:cds.cern.ch:14865972011 |
spellingShingle | Mathematical Physics and Mathematics Chalkiadakis, Georgios Elkind, Edith Wooldridge, Michael Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory |
title | Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory |
title_full | Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory |
title_fullStr | Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory |
title_full_unstemmed | Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory |
title_short | Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory |
title_sort | computational aspects of cooperative game theory |
topic | Mathematical Physics and Mathematics |
url | http://cds.cern.ch/record/1486597 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT chalkiadakisgeorgios computationalaspectsofcooperativegametheory AT elkindedith computationalaspectsofcooperativegametheory AT wooldridgemichael computationalaspectsofcooperativegametheory |