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Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. It also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner.
Autores principales: | Gehrlein, William V, Lepelley, Dominique |
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Lenguaje: | eng |
Publicado: |
Springer
2011
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | http://cds.cern.ch/record/2278682 |
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