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Non-Bayesian decision theory: beliefs and desires as reasons for action
This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. It provides the first non-Bayesian account of normative decision theory and includes a formal account of the framing of decision problems.
Autor principal: | Peterson, Martin |
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Lenguaje: | eng |
Publicado: |
Springer
2008
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | http://cds.cern.ch/record/2283304 |
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