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Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Pepper, Alexander
Lenguaje:eng
Publicado: Palgrave Macmillan 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://cds.cern.ch/record/2710735
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author Pepper, Alexander
author_facet Pepper, Alexander
author_sort Pepper, Alexander
collection CERN
id cern-2710735
institution Organización Europea para la Investigación Nuclear
language eng
publishDate 2018
publisher Palgrave Macmillan
record_format invenio
spelling cern-27107352021-04-21T18:10:08Zhttp://cds.cern.ch/record/2710735engPepper, AlexanderAgency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemmaInformation Transfer and ManagementPalgrave Macmillanoai:cds.cern.ch:27107352018
spellingShingle Information Transfer and Management
Pepper, Alexander
Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
title Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
title_full Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
title_fullStr Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
title_full_unstemmed Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
title_short Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
title_sort agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
topic Information Transfer and Management
url http://cds.cern.ch/record/2710735
work_keys_str_mv AT pepperalexander agencytheoryandexecutivepaytheremunerationcommitteesdilemma