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Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma
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Lenguaje: | eng |
Publicado: |
Palgrave Macmillan
2018
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Acceso en línea: | http://cds.cern.ch/record/2710735 |
_version_ | 1780965147925282816 |
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author | Pepper, Alexander |
author_facet | Pepper, Alexander |
author_sort | Pepper, Alexander |
collection | CERN |
id | cern-2710735 |
institution | Organización Europea para la Investigación Nuclear |
language | eng |
publishDate | 2018 |
publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
record_format | invenio |
spelling | cern-27107352021-04-21T18:10:08Zhttp://cds.cern.ch/record/2710735engPepper, AlexanderAgency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemmaInformation Transfer and ManagementPalgrave Macmillanoai:cds.cern.ch:27107352018 |
spellingShingle | Information Transfer and Management Pepper, Alexander Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
title | Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
title_full | Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
title_fullStr | Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
title_full_unstemmed | Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
title_short | Agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
title_sort | agency theory and executive pay: the remuneration committee's dilemma |
topic | Information Transfer and Management |
url | http://cds.cern.ch/record/2710735 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pepperalexander agencytheoryandexecutivepaytheremunerationcommitteesdilemma |