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“Internet+ Recycling” Platform Participation Selection Strategy in a Two-Echelon Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain
Compared with traditional offline recycling channel, recycling through the “Internet+ recycling” platform has increasingly attracted the academic and practical intention in the past decade because of its accessibility and convenience. To promote the recycling initiatives and construct sustainable op...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10001791/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36901010 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20053999 |
Sumario: | Compared with traditional offline recycling channel, recycling through the “Internet+ recycling” platform has increasingly attracted the academic and practical intention in the past decade because of its accessibility and convenience. To promote the recycling initiatives and construct sustainable operations, how to stimulate supply chain stakeholders participating in the online recycling becomes a challenge issue. This paper considers one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party recycler (3PR) in a two-echelon remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain with an “Internet+ recycling” platform, in which consumers can access the online recycling platform and make an appointment for recycling without a physical visit. The manufacturer has three choices: either do not participate or participate with one of two strategies: cost-sharing (CS) or active promotion (AP) strategy. We develop a Stackelberg game model to study the motivation of the manufacturer to participate in the “Internet+ recycling” platform and the influence mechanism of key factors. The key findings include the following: (1) compared with the case without the “Internet+ recycling” platform, when the proportion of cost sharing for the 3PR is low, strategy CS contributes to the improvement of the 3PR’s performance; (2) in the presence of two participation strategies, when the disassembly rate is low enough, the manufacturer prefers strategy AP; otherwise, he selects strategy CS; and (3) a high proportion of cost sharing for the manufacturer or low promotion effort cost can increase the whole profit of the closed-loop supply chain. |
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