Coupled simultaneous analysis of vaccine and self-awareness strategies on evolutionary dilemma aspect with various immunity

On evolutionary game theory (EGT), two intervention policies: vaccination and self-awareness, are considered to account for how human attitude impacts disease spreading. Although these interventions can impose, their implementation may depend on the various immunity systems such as shield immunity, innate immunity, waning immunity, natural immunity, and artificial immunity. This framework provides an epidemic SEIRVA (susceptible-exposed-infected-removed-vaccinated-aware) model and two EGT dynamics to analyze the interplay between the immunity system and social learning interventions. The prospect of exploring the individual's strategy and social dilemma for removing a disease could assist design an effective vaccine program and self-awareness policy. Also, we evaluated the indicator of social efficiency deficit (SED) for a social dual-dilemma to measure the presence of a dilemma situation. Extensive theoretical analysis displays that stability includes the reproduction number, conditions for positivity and uniqueness, and the strength number analyzed in the equilibria, including fundamental properties validated by numerical simulation of the discretization method that appraises a variety of graphs at adjusting parameters. We present extensive numerical studies investigating the affect of controlling parameters, individual vulnerability, optimal policies, and individual costs. It turns out that, even with the affordable vaccine, individuals may have very different behaviors; self-awareness strategy plays a vital role in controlling diseases.