How to Effectively Reduce Honey Adulteration in China: An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Apiculture has been greatly developed in recent years in China. Beekeeping cooperatives and honey manufacturing enterprises have increased rapidly. As a result, a variety of honey products have entered the market, adding vitality to the food economy; however, the adulteration of honey products is on the rise in China. Previous attempts to control the adulteration of honey products mostly relied on technical, product-specific measures, and there was a lack of modeling research to guide the supervision of the honey product industry. In order to help local governments to better control the adulteration of honey products from a management perspective, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model composed of beekeeping cooperatives, honey product enterprises, and local governments. Through stability analysis and model simulation, we found that local government subsidies to cooperatives have little impact on the game system. Local government penalties to cooperatives and price adjustments of unadulterated raw honey by cooperatives are effective management tools to reduce the adulteration behavior of cooperatives. Local government penalties for enterprises are an effective management tool to reduce the adulteration behavior of enterprises. This research provides useful information for government agencies to design appropriate policies/business modes so as to promote sustainability and the healthy development of the honey product industry in China.