Collateral Victims of Defensive Medical Practice

This paper analyzes the phenomenon of defensive medical practice, starting from the doctor–patient relationship, and the behavioral and professional factors that can influence the proper functioning of this relationship and the healthcare system. We analyze medical malpractice, given the increase in the number of accusations, as an essential factor in triggering the defensive behavior of doctors, together with other complementary factors that emphasize the need for protection and safety of doctors. The possible consequences for the doctor–patient relationship that defensive practice can generate are presented and identified by analyzing the determining role of the type of health system (fault and no-fault). At the same time, we investigate the context in which overspecialization of medical personnel can generate a form of defensive practice as a result of the limiting effect on the performance of a certain category of operations and procedures. The increase in the number of malpractice accusations impacts the medical community—“the stress syndrome induced by medical malpractice”—turning doctors into collateral victims who, under the pressure of diminishing their reputational safety, practice defensively to protect themselves from future accusations. This type of defensive behavior puts pressure on the entire healthcare system by continuously increasing costs and unresolved cases, which impact patients by limiting access to medical services in the public and private sectors.