Cargando…
Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem
Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person’s sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Banglades...
Autores principales: | , , , |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
North-Holland Pub. Co.]
2023
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10115903/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37139484 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103072 |
_version_ | 1785028309013233664 |
---|---|
author | Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab Guiteras, Raymond P. Levinsohn, James Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq |
author_facet | Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab Guiteras, Raymond P. Levinsohn, James Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq |
author_sort | Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab |
collection | PubMed |
description | Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person’s sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the group, or asked each group member to make a private or public pledge to maintain a hygienic latrine. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5–12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership, but this effect dissipates in the medium term (15 months). In contrast, the public commitment induced a 4.2–6.3 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term, but this effect persists in the medium term. Non-financial social recognition or a private pledge has no detectable effect on sanitation investments. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10115903 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | North-Holland Pub. Co.] |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-101159032023-05-01 Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab Guiteras, Raymond P. Levinsohn, James Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq J Dev Econ Regular Article Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person’s sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the group, or asked each group member to make a private or public pledge to maintain a hygienic latrine. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5–12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership, but this effect dissipates in the medium term (15 months). In contrast, the public commitment induced a 4.2–6.3 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term, but this effect persists in the medium term. Non-financial social recognition or a private pledge has no detectable effect on sanitation investments. North-Holland Pub. Co.] 2023-05 /pmc/articles/PMC10115903/ /pubmed/37139484 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103072 Text en © 2023 The Authors https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Regular Article Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab Guiteras, Raymond P. Levinsohn, James Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
title | Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
title_full | Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
title_fullStr | Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
title_full_unstemmed | Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
title_short | Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
title_sort | social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem |
topic | Regular Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10115903/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37139484 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103072 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT bakhtiarmmehrab socialandfinancialincentivesforovercomingacollectiveactionproblem AT guiterasraymondp socialandfinancialincentivesforovercomingacollectiveactionproblem AT levinsohnjames socialandfinancialincentivesforovercomingacollectiveactionproblem AT mobarakahmedmushfiq socialandfinancialincentivesforovercomingacollectiveactionproblem |