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Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment
Background: Informal payments for healthcare are typically regressive and limit access to quality healthcare while increasing risk of catastrophic health expenditure, especially in developing countries. Different responses have been proposed, but little is known about how they influence the incentiv...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Kerman University of Medical Sciences
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10125169/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37579473 http://dx.doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2022.6877 |
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author | Binyaruka, Peter Andreoni, Antonio Balabanova, Dina McKee, Martin Hutchinson, Eleanor Angell, Blake |
author_facet | Binyaruka, Peter Andreoni, Antonio Balabanova, Dina McKee, Martin Hutchinson, Eleanor Angell, Blake |
author_sort | Binyaruka, Peter |
collection | PubMed |
description | Background: Informal payments for healthcare are typically regressive and limit access to quality healthcare while increasing risk of catastrophic health expenditure, especially in developing countries. Different responses have been proposed, but little is known about how they influence the incentives driving this behaviour. We therefore identified providers’ preferences for policy interventions to overcome informal payments in Tanzania. Methods: We undertook a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit preferences over various policy options with 432 health providers in 42 public health facilities in Pwani and Dar es Salaam region. DCE attributes were derived from a multi-stage process including a literature review, qualitative interviews with key informants, a workshop with health stakeholders, expert opinions, and a pilot test. Each respondent received 12 unlabelled choice sets describing two hypothetical job-settings that varied across 6-attributes: mode of payment, supervision at facility, opportunity for private practice, awareness and monitoring, measures against informal payments, and incentive payments to encourage noninfraction. Mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) models were used for estimation. Results: All attributes, apart from supervision at facility, significantly influenced providers’ choices (P<.001). Health providers strongly and significantly preferred incentive payments for non-infraction and opportunities for private practice, but significantly disliked disciplinary measures at district level. Preferences varied across the sample, although all groups significantly preferred the opportunity to practice privately and cashless payment. Disciplinary measures at district level were significantly disliked by unit in-charges, those who never engaged in informal payments, and who were not absent from work for official trip. 10% salary top-up were preferred incentive by all, except those who engaged in informal payments and absent from work for official trip. Conclusion: Better working conditions, with improved earnings and career paths, were strongly preferred by all, different respondents groups had distinct preferences according to their characteristics, suggesting the need for adoption of tailored packages of interventions. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10125169 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Kerman University of Medical Sciences |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-101251692023-04-25 Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment Binyaruka, Peter Andreoni, Antonio Balabanova, Dina McKee, Martin Hutchinson, Eleanor Angell, Blake Int J Health Policy Manag Original Article Background: Informal payments for healthcare are typically regressive and limit access to quality healthcare while increasing risk of catastrophic health expenditure, especially in developing countries. Different responses have been proposed, but little is known about how they influence the incentives driving this behaviour. We therefore identified providers’ preferences for policy interventions to overcome informal payments in Tanzania. Methods: We undertook a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit preferences over various policy options with 432 health providers in 42 public health facilities in Pwani and Dar es Salaam region. DCE attributes were derived from a multi-stage process including a literature review, qualitative interviews with key informants, a workshop with health stakeholders, expert opinions, and a pilot test. Each respondent received 12 unlabelled choice sets describing two hypothetical job-settings that varied across 6-attributes: mode of payment, supervision at facility, opportunity for private practice, awareness and monitoring, measures against informal payments, and incentive payments to encourage noninfraction. Mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) models were used for estimation. Results: All attributes, apart from supervision at facility, significantly influenced providers’ choices (P<.001). Health providers strongly and significantly preferred incentive payments for non-infraction and opportunities for private practice, but significantly disliked disciplinary measures at district level. Preferences varied across the sample, although all groups significantly preferred the opportunity to practice privately and cashless payment. Disciplinary measures at district level were significantly disliked by unit in-charges, those who never engaged in informal payments, and who were not absent from work for official trip. 10% salary top-up were preferred incentive by all, except those who engaged in informal payments and absent from work for official trip. Conclusion: Better working conditions, with improved earnings and career paths, were strongly preferred by all, different respondents groups had distinct preferences according to their characteristics, suggesting the need for adoption of tailored packages of interventions. Kerman University of Medical Sciences 2022-12-03 /pmc/articles/PMC10125169/ /pubmed/37579473 http://dx.doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2022.6877 Text en © 2023 The Author(s); Published by Kerman University of Medical Sciences https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Original Article Binyaruka, Peter Andreoni, Antonio Balabanova, Dina McKee, Martin Hutchinson, Eleanor Angell, Blake Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment |
title | Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment |
title_full | Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment |
title_fullStr | Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment |
title_full_unstemmed | Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment |
title_short | Re-aligning Incentives to Address Informal Payments in Tanzania Public Health Facilities: A Discrete Choice Experiment |
title_sort | re-aligning incentives to address informal payments in tanzania public health facilities: a discrete choice experiment |
topic | Original Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10125169/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37579473 http://dx.doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2022.6877 |
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