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Adversarial Decision-Making for Moving Target Defense: A Multi-Agent Markov Game and Reinforcement Learning Approach

Reinforcement learning has shown a great ability and has defeated human beings in the field of real-time strategy games. In recent years, reinforcement learning has been used in cyberspace to carry out automated and intelligent attacks. Traditional defense methods are not enough to deal with this pr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Yao, Qian, Wang, Yongjie, Xiong, Xinli, Wang, Peng, Li, Yang
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10137508/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37190393
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25040605
Descripción
Sumario:Reinforcement learning has shown a great ability and has defeated human beings in the field of real-time strategy games. In recent years, reinforcement learning has been used in cyberspace to carry out automated and intelligent attacks. Traditional defense methods are not enough to deal with this problem, so it is necessary to design defense agents to counter intelligent attacks. The interaction between the attack agent and the defense agent can be modeled as a multi-agent Markov game. In this paper, an adversarial decision-making approach that combines the Bayesian Strong Stackelberg and the WoLF algorithms was proposed to obtain the equilibrium point of multi-agent Markov games. With this method, the defense agent can obtain the adversarial decision-making strategy as well as continuously adjust the strategy in cyberspace. As verified in experiments, the defense agent should attach importance to short-term rewards in the process of a real-time game between the attack agent and the defense agent. The proposed approach can obtain the largest rewards for defense agent compared with the classic Nash-Q and URS-Q algorithms. In addition, the proposed approach adjusts the action selection probability dynamically, so that the decision entropy of optimal action gradually decreases.