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Electoral rewards for political grandstanding
Many assumed that legislators send political messages or even grandstand in expectation of gaining electoral rewards. However, largely due to a lack of proper data and measurements, this assumption has not been tested. Publicized committee hearings provide a unique environment to consistently observ...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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National Academy of Sciences
2023
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10151507/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37071678 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2214697120 |
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author | Park, Ju Yeon |
author_facet | Park, Ju Yeon |
author_sort | Park, Ju Yeon |
collection | PubMed |
description | Many assumed that legislators send political messages or even grandstand in expectation of gaining electoral rewards. However, largely due to a lack of proper data and measurements, this assumption has not been tested. Publicized committee hearings provide a unique environment to consistently observe changes in legislators’ speech patterns and test this assumption. Using House committee hearing transcripts from 1997 to 2016 and Grandstanding Scores–which capture the intensity of political messages conveyed in members’ statements in hearings–I find that an increase in a member’s messaging efforts in a given Congress leads to increased vote share in the following election. This suggests that legislators’ grandstanding remarks, often regarded as cheap talk, can be an effective electoral strategy. Additional findings suggest that PAC donors respond differently to members’ grandstanding behavior. Specifically, while voters react to members’ grandstanding positively but are ignorant about their legislative effectiveness, PAC donors are unmoved by members’ grandstanding behaviors and reward members’ effective law-making activities instead. These asymmetric reactions from voters and donors may provide members with a twisted incentive to appeal to voters merely by making impressive, political speeches while legislating in favor of organized interests, which raises concerns about how representative democracy works. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10151507 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | National Academy of Sciences |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-101515072023-05-03 Electoral rewards for political grandstanding Park, Ju Yeon Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Social Sciences Many assumed that legislators send political messages or even grandstand in expectation of gaining electoral rewards. However, largely due to a lack of proper data and measurements, this assumption has not been tested. Publicized committee hearings provide a unique environment to consistently observe changes in legislators’ speech patterns and test this assumption. Using House committee hearing transcripts from 1997 to 2016 and Grandstanding Scores–which capture the intensity of political messages conveyed in members’ statements in hearings–I find that an increase in a member’s messaging efforts in a given Congress leads to increased vote share in the following election. This suggests that legislators’ grandstanding remarks, often regarded as cheap talk, can be an effective electoral strategy. Additional findings suggest that PAC donors respond differently to members’ grandstanding behavior. Specifically, while voters react to members’ grandstanding positively but are ignorant about their legislative effectiveness, PAC donors are unmoved by members’ grandstanding behaviors and reward members’ effective law-making activities instead. These asymmetric reactions from voters and donors may provide members with a twisted incentive to appeal to voters merely by making impressive, political speeches while legislating in favor of organized interests, which raises concerns about how representative democracy works. National Academy of Sciences 2023-04-18 2023-04-25 /pmc/articles/PMC10151507/ /pubmed/37071678 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2214697120 Text en Copyright © 2023 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (CC BY) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Social Sciences Park, Ju Yeon Electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
title | Electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
title_full | Electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
title_fullStr | Electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
title_full_unstemmed | Electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
title_short | Electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
title_sort | electoral rewards for political grandstanding |
topic | Social Sciences |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10151507/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37071678 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2214697120 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT parkjuyeon electoralrewardsforpoliticalgrandstanding |