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Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives

The Meaning First Approach offers a model of the relation between thought and language that includes a Generator and a Compressor. The Generator build non-linguistic thought structures and the Compressor is responsible for its articulation through three processes: structure-preserving linearization,...

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Autores principales: Guasti, Maria Teresa, Alexiadou, Artemis, Sauerland, Uli
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10193858/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37213391
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1104930
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author Guasti, Maria Teresa
Alexiadou, Artemis
Sauerland, Uli
author_facet Guasti, Maria Teresa
Alexiadou, Artemis
Sauerland, Uli
author_sort Guasti, Maria Teresa
collection PubMed
description The Meaning First Approach offers a model of the relation between thought and language that includes a Generator and a Compressor. The Generator build non-linguistic thought structures and the Compressor is responsible for its articulation through three processes: structure-preserving linearization, lexification, and compression via non-articulation of concepts when licensed. One goal of this paper is to show that a range of phenomena in child language can be explained in a unified way within the Meaning First Approach by the assumption that children differ from adults with respect to compression and, specifically, that they may undercompress in production, an idea that sets a research agenda for the study of language acquisition. We focus on dependencies involving pronouns or gaps in relative clauses and wh-questions, multi-argument verbal concepts, and antonymic concepts involving negation or other opposites. We present extant evidence from the literature that children produce undercompression errors (a type of commission errors) that are predicted by the Meaning First Approach. We also summarize data that children’s comprehension ability provides evidence for the Meaning First Approach prediction that decompression should be challenging, when there is no 1-to-1 correspondence.
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spelling pubmed-101938582023-05-19 Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives Guasti, Maria Teresa Alexiadou, Artemis Sauerland, Uli Front Psychol Psychology The Meaning First Approach offers a model of the relation between thought and language that includes a Generator and a Compressor. The Generator build non-linguistic thought structures and the Compressor is responsible for its articulation through three processes: structure-preserving linearization, lexification, and compression via non-articulation of concepts when licensed. One goal of this paper is to show that a range of phenomena in child language can be explained in a unified way within the Meaning First Approach by the assumption that children differ from adults with respect to compression and, specifically, that they may undercompress in production, an idea that sets a research agenda for the study of language acquisition. We focus on dependencies involving pronouns or gaps in relative clauses and wh-questions, multi-argument verbal concepts, and antonymic concepts involving negation or other opposites. We present extant evidence from the literature that children produce undercompression errors (a type of commission errors) that are predicted by the Meaning First Approach. We also summarize data that children’s comprehension ability provides evidence for the Meaning First Approach prediction that decompression should be challenging, when there is no 1-to-1 correspondence. Frontiers Media S.A. 2023-04-26 /pmc/articles/PMC10193858/ /pubmed/37213391 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1104930 Text en Copyright © 2023 Guasti, Alexiadou and Sauerland. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Guasti, Maria Teresa
Alexiadou, Artemis
Sauerland, Uli
Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
title Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
title_full Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
title_fullStr Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
title_full_unstemmed Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
title_short Undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
title_sort undercompression errors as evidence for conceptual primitives
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10193858/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37213391
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1104930
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