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Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to up...

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Autores principales: Fujimoto, Yuma, Ohtsuki, Hisashi
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: National Academy of Sciences 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10194006/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37155910
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2300544120
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author Fujimoto, Yuma
Ohtsuki, Hisashi
author_facet Fujimoto, Yuma
Ohtsuki, Hisashi
author_sort Fujimoto, Yuma
collection PubMed
description Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.
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spelling pubmed-101940062023-11-08 Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment Fujimoto, Yuma Ohtsuki, Hisashi Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Biological Sciences Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation. National Academy of Sciences 2023-05-08 2023-05-16 /pmc/articles/PMC10194006/ /pubmed/37155910 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2300544120 Text en Copyright © 2023 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) .
spellingShingle Biological Sciences
Fujimoto, Yuma
Ohtsuki, Hisashi
Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
title Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
title_full Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
title_fullStr Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
title_short Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
title_sort evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
topic Biological Sciences
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10194006/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37155910
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2300544120
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