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Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to up...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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National Academy of Sciences
2023
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10194006/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37155910 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2300544120 |
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author | Fujimoto, Yuma Ohtsuki, Hisashi |
author_facet | Fujimoto, Yuma Ohtsuki, Hisashi |
author_sort | Fujimoto, Yuma |
collection | PubMed |
description | Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10194006 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | National Academy of Sciences |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-101940062023-11-08 Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment Fujimoto, Yuma Ohtsuki, Hisashi Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Biological Sciences Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others’ reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation. National Academy of Sciences 2023-05-08 2023-05-16 /pmc/articles/PMC10194006/ /pubmed/37155910 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2300544120 Text en Copyright © 2023 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Biological Sciences Fujimoto, Yuma Ohtsuki, Hisashi Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
title | Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
title_full | Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
title_fullStr | Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
title_full_unstemmed | Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
title_short | Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
title_sort | evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment |
topic | Biological Sciences |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10194006/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37155910 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2300544120 |
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