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Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of fut...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10198723/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37204305 http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.82954 |
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author | Liu, Linjie Chen, Xiaojie Szolnoki, Attila |
author_facet | Liu, Linjie Chen, Xiaojie Szolnoki, Attila |
author_sort | Liu, Linjie |
collection | PubMed |
description | Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals’ behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10198723 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-101987232023-05-20 Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game Liu, Linjie Chen, Xiaojie Szolnoki, Attila eLife Computational and Systems Biology Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals’ behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction. eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd 2023-05-19 /pmc/articles/PMC10198723/ /pubmed/37204305 http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.82954 Text en © 2023, Liu et al https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use and redistribution provided that the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Computational and Systems Biology Liu, Linjie Chen, Xiaojie Szolnoki, Attila Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
title | Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
title_full | Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
title_fullStr | Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
title_full_unstemmed | Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
title_short | Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
title_sort | coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game |
topic | Computational and Systems Biology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10198723/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37204305 http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.82954 |
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