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Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of fut...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Liu, Linjie, Chen, Xiaojie, Szolnoki, Attila
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10198723/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37204305
http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.82954
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author Liu, Linjie
Chen, Xiaojie
Szolnoki, Attila
author_facet Liu, Linjie
Chen, Xiaojie
Szolnoki, Attila
author_sort Liu, Linjie
collection PubMed
description Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals’ behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.
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spelling pubmed-101987232023-05-20 Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game Liu, Linjie Chen, Xiaojie Szolnoki, Attila eLife Computational and Systems Biology Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals’ behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction. eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd 2023-05-19 /pmc/articles/PMC10198723/ /pubmed/37204305 http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.82954 Text en © 2023, Liu et al https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use and redistribution provided that the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Computational and Systems Biology
Liu, Linjie
Chen, Xiaojie
Szolnoki, Attila
Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
title Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
title_full Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
title_fullStr Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
title_full_unstemmed Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
title_short Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
title_sort coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game
topic Computational and Systems Biology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10198723/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37204305
http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.82954
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AT szolnokiattila coevolutionarydynamicsviaadaptivefeedbackincollectiverisksocialdilemmagame