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Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind
From sparse descriptions of events, observers can make systematic and nuanced predictions of what emotions the people involved will experience. We propose a formal model of emotion prediction in the context of a public high-stakes social dilemma. This model uses inverse planning to infer a person’s...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10239682/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37271174 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2022.0047 |
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author | Houlihan, Sean Dae Kleiman-Weiner, Max Hewitt, Luke B. Tenenbaum, Joshua B. Saxe, Rebecca |
author_facet | Houlihan, Sean Dae Kleiman-Weiner, Max Hewitt, Luke B. Tenenbaum, Joshua B. Saxe, Rebecca |
author_sort | Houlihan, Sean Dae |
collection | PubMed |
description | From sparse descriptions of events, observers can make systematic and nuanced predictions of what emotions the people involved will experience. We propose a formal model of emotion prediction in the context of a public high-stakes social dilemma. This model uses inverse planning to infer a person’s beliefs and preferences, including social preferences for equity and for maintaining a good reputation. The model then combines these inferred mental contents with the event to compute ‘appraisals’: whether the situation conformed to the expectations and fulfilled the preferences. We learn functions mapping computed appraisals to emotion labels, allowing the model to match human observers’ quantitative predictions of 20 emotions, including joy, relief, guilt and envy. Model comparison indicates that inferred monetary preferences are not sufficient to explain observers’ emotion predictions; inferred social preferences are factored into predictions for nearly every emotion. Human observers and the model both use minimal individualizing information to adjust predictions of how different people will respond to the same event. Thus, our framework integrates inverse planning, event appraisals and emotion concepts in a single computational model to reverse-engineer people’s intuitive theory of emotions. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘Cognitive artificial intelligence’. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10239682 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | The Royal Society |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-102396822023-06-05 Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind Houlihan, Sean Dae Kleiman-Weiner, Max Hewitt, Luke B. Tenenbaum, Joshua B. Saxe, Rebecca Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci Articles From sparse descriptions of events, observers can make systematic and nuanced predictions of what emotions the people involved will experience. We propose a formal model of emotion prediction in the context of a public high-stakes social dilemma. This model uses inverse planning to infer a person’s beliefs and preferences, including social preferences for equity and for maintaining a good reputation. The model then combines these inferred mental contents with the event to compute ‘appraisals’: whether the situation conformed to the expectations and fulfilled the preferences. We learn functions mapping computed appraisals to emotion labels, allowing the model to match human observers’ quantitative predictions of 20 emotions, including joy, relief, guilt and envy. Model comparison indicates that inferred monetary preferences are not sufficient to explain observers’ emotion predictions; inferred social preferences are factored into predictions for nearly every emotion. Human observers and the model both use minimal individualizing information to adjust predictions of how different people will respond to the same event. Thus, our framework integrates inverse planning, event appraisals and emotion concepts in a single computational model to reverse-engineer people’s intuitive theory of emotions. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘Cognitive artificial intelligence’. The Royal Society 2023-07-24 2023-06-05 /pmc/articles/PMC10239682/ /pubmed/37271174 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2022.0047 Text en © 2023 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Articles Houlihan, Sean Dae Kleiman-Weiner, Max Hewitt, Luke B. Tenenbaum, Joshua B. Saxe, Rebecca Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
title | Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
title_full | Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
title_fullStr | Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
title_full_unstemmed | Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
title_short | Emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
title_sort | emotion prediction as computation over a generative theory of mind |
topic | Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10239682/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37271174 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2022.0047 |
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