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Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective
Ensuring the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies during a public health emergency is crucial to quickly containing the further spread of the epidemic and restoring the order of rescue and treatment. However, due to the shortage of medical supplies, there are challenges to rationaliz...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Nature Publishing Group UK
2023
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10261847/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37311795 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36000-y |
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author | Yuan, Youwei Du, Lanying Luo, Lanjun Cui, Lei |
author_facet | Yuan, Youwei Du, Lanying Luo, Lanjun Cui, Lei |
author_sort | Yuan, Youwei |
collection | PubMed |
description | Ensuring the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies during a public health emergency is crucial to quickly containing the further spread of the epidemic and restoring the order of rescue and treatment. However, due to the shortage of medical supplies, there are challenges to rationalizing the allocation of critical medical supplies among multiple parties with conflicting interests. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to study the allocation of medical supplies in the rescue environment of public health emergencies under conditions of incomplete information. The game’s players include Government-owned Nonprofit Organizations (GNPOs), hospitals, and the government. By analyzing the equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game, this paper makes an in-depth study on the optimal allocation strategy of medical supplies. The findings indicate that: (1) the hospital should reasonably increase its willingness to accept the allocation plan of medical supplies, which can help medical supplies allocate more scientifically. (2) The government should design a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies, which can reduce the interference of GNPOs and hospitals in the allocation process of medical supplies. (3) Higher authorities should strengthen the supervision of the government and the accountability for loose supervision. The findings of this research can guide the government in promoting better circulation of medical supplies during public health emergencies by formulating more reasonable allocation schemes of emergency medical supplies, as well as incentives and penalties. At the same time, for GNPOs with limited emergency medical supplies, the equal allocation of emergency supplies is not the optimal solution to improve the efficiency of emergency relief, and it is simpler to achieve the goal of maximizing social benefits by allocating limited emergency resources to the demand points that match the degree of urgency. For example, in Corona Virus Disease 2019, emergency medical supplies should be prioritized for allocation to government-designated fever hospitals that are have a greater need for medical supplies and greater treatment capacity. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10261847 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | Nature Publishing Group UK |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-102618472023-06-14 Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective Yuan, Youwei Du, Lanying Luo, Lanjun Cui, Lei Sci Rep Article Ensuring the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies during a public health emergency is crucial to quickly containing the further spread of the epidemic and restoring the order of rescue and treatment. However, due to the shortage of medical supplies, there are challenges to rationalizing the allocation of critical medical supplies among multiple parties with conflicting interests. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to study the allocation of medical supplies in the rescue environment of public health emergencies under conditions of incomplete information. The game’s players include Government-owned Nonprofit Organizations (GNPOs), hospitals, and the government. By analyzing the equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game, this paper makes an in-depth study on the optimal allocation strategy of medical supplies. The findings indicate that: (1) the hospital should reasonably increase its willingness to accept the allocation plan of medical supplies, which can help medical supplies allocate more scientifically. (2) The government should design a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies, which can reduce the interference of GNPOs and hospitals in the allocation process of medical supplies. (3) Higher authorities should strengthen the supervision of the government and the accountability for loose supervision. The findings of this research can guide the government in promoting better circulation of medical supplies during public health emergencies by formulating more reasonable allocation schemes of emergency medical supplies, as well as incentives and penalties. At the same time, for GNPOs with limited emergency medical supplies, the equal allocation of emergency supplies is not the optimal solution to improve the efficiency of emergency relief, and it is simpler to achieve the goal of maximizing social benefits by allocating limited emergency resources to the demand points that match the degree of urgency. For example, in Corona Virus Disease 2019, emergency medical supplies should be prioritized for allocation to government-designated fever hospitals that are have a greater need for medical supplies and greater treatment capacity. Nature Publishing Group UK 2023-06-13 /pmc/articles/PMC10261847/ /pubmed/37311795 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36000-y Text en © The Author(s) 2023 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Article Yuan, Youwei Du, Lanying Luo, Lanjun Cui, Lei Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
title | Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
title_full | Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
title_fullStr | Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
title_full_unstemmed | Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
title_short | Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
title_sort | allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10261847/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37311795 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36000-y |
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