Cargando…

Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers

People commonly reject unfair offers even if this leaves them worse off. Some explain this as a rational response based on social preferences. Others argue that emotions override self-interest in the determination of rejection behavior. We conducted an experiment in which we measured responders’ bio...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Buskens, Vincent, Kovacic, Ingrid, Rutterkamp, Elwin, van de Rijt, Arnout, Terburg, David
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group UK 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10264406/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37311882
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36715-y
_version_ 1785058315980505088
author Buskens, Vincent
Kovacic, Ingrid
Rutterkamp, Elwin
van de Rijt, Arnout
Terburg, David
author_facet Buskens, Vincent
Kovacic, Ingrid
Rutterkamp, Elwin
van de Rijt, Arnout
Terburg, David
author_sort Buskens, Vincent
collection PubMed
description People commonly reject unfair offers even if this leaves them worse off. Some explain this as a rational response based on social preferences. Others argue that emotions override self-interest in the determination of rejection behavior. We conducted an experiment in which we measured responders’ biophysical reactions (EEG and EMG) to fair and unfair offers. We measured biophysical trait anger using resting-state EEG (frontal alpha-asymmetry), state anger using facial expressions, offer expectancy processing using event-related EEG (medial-frontal negativity; MFN) and self-reported emotions. We systematically varied whether rejections led proposers to lose their share (Ultimatum Game; UG) or not (Impunity Game; IG). Results favor preference-based accounts: Impunity minimizes rejection despite increasing subjectively reported anger. Unfair offers evoke frowning responses, but frowning does not predict rejection. Prosocial responders reject unfair UG offers more often after unmet fairness expectations. These results suggest that responders do not reject unfairness out of anger. Rather, people seem motivated to reject unfair offers when they violate their behavioral code but only when rejection has payoff consequences for the proposer, allowing them to reciprocate and restore equity. Thus, social preferences trump emotions when responding to unfair offers.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-10264406
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2023
publisher Nature Publishing Group UK
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-102644062023-06-15 Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers Buskens, Vincent Kovacic, Ingrid Rutterkamp, Elwin van de Rijt, Arnout Terburg, David Sci Rep Article People commonly reject unfair offers even if this leaves them worse off. Some explain this as a rational response based on social preferences. Others argue that emotions override self-interest in the determination of rejection behavior. We conducted an experiment in which we measured responders’ biophysical reactions (EEG and EMG) to fair and unfair offers. We measured biophysical trait anger using resting-state EEG (frontal alpha-asymmetry), state anger using facial expressions, offer expectancy processing using event-related EEG (medial-frontal negativity; MFN) and self-reported emotions. We systematically varied whether rejections led proposers to lose their share (Ultimatum Game; UG) or not (Impunity Game; IG). Results favor preference-based accounts: Impunity minimizes rejection despite increasing subjectively reported anger. Unfair offers evoke frowning responses, but frowning does not predict rejection. Prosocial responders reject unfair UG offers more often after unmet fairness expectations. These results suggest that responders do not reject unfairness out of anger. Rather, people seem motivated to reject unfair offers when they violate their behavioral code but only when rejection has payoff consequences for the proposer, allowing them to reciprocate and restore equity. Thus, social preferences trump emotions when responding to unfair offers. Nature Publishing Group UK 2023-06-13 /pmc/articles/PMC10264406/ /pubmed/37311882 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36715-y Text en © The Author(s) 2023 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) .
spellingShingle Article
Buskens, Vincent
Kovacic, Ingrid
Rutterkamp, Elwin
van de Rijt, Arnout
Terburg, David
Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
title Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
title_full Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
title_fullStr Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
title_full_unstemmed Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
title_short Social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
title_sort social preferences trump emotions in human responses to unfair offers
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10264406/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37311882
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36715-y
work_keys_str_mv AT buskensvincent socialpreferencestrumpemotionsinhumanresponsestounfairoffers
AT kovacicingrid socialpreferencestrumpemotionsinhumanresponsestounfairoffers
AT rutterkampelwin socialpreferencestrumpemotionsinhumanresponsestounfairoffers
AT vanderijtarnout socialpreferencestrumpemotionsinhumanresponsestounfairoffers
AT terburgdavid socialpreferencestrumpemotionsinhumanresponsestounfairoffers