Cargando…

Evolution of norms for judging social behavior

Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone’s reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develo...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kessinger, Taylor A., Tarnita, Corina E., Plotkin, Joshua B.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: National Academy of Sciences 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10268218/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37276388
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2219480120
_version_ 1785145922011791360
author Kessinger, Taylor A.
Tarnita, Corina E.
Plotkin, Joshua B.
author_facet Kessinger, Taylor A.
Tarnita, Corina E.
Plotkin, Joshua B.
author_sort Kessinger, Taylor A.
collection PubMed
description Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone’s reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population—especially if it adopts the Stern Judging norm, which assigns a bad reputation to individuals who cooperate with those of bad standing. When individuals do not change group membership, stratifying reputation information into groups tends to destabilize cooperation, unless individuals are strongly insular and favor in-group social interactions. We discuss the implications of our results for the structure of information flow in a population and for the evolution of social norms of judgment.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-10268218
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2023
publisher National Academy of Sciences
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-102682182023-12-05 Evolution of norms for judging social behavior Kessinger, Taylor A. Tarnita, Corina E. Plotkin, Joshua B. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Social Sciences Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone’s reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population—especially if it adopts the Stern Judging norm, which assigns a bad reputation to individuals who cooperate with those of bad standing. When individuals do not change group membership, stratifying reputation information into groups tends to destabilize cooperation, unless individuals are strongly insular and favor in-group social interactions. We discuss the implications of our results for the structure of information flow in a population and for the evolution of social norms of judgment. National Academy of Sciences 2023-06-05 2023-06-13 /pmc/articles/PMC10268218/ /pubmed/37276388 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2219480120 Text en Copyright © 2023 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) .
spellingShingle Social Sciences
Kessinger, Taylor A.
Tarnita, Corina E.
Plotkin, Joshua B.
Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
title Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
title_full Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
title_fullStr Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
title_full_unstemmed Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
title_short Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
title_sort evolution of norms for judging social behavior
topic Social Sciences
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10268218/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37276388
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2219480120
work_keys_str_mv AT kessingertaylora evolutionofnormsforjudgingsocialbehavior
AT tarnitacorinae evolutionofnormsforjudgingsocialbehavior
AT plotkinjoshuab evolutionofnormsforjudgingsocialbehavior