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When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer–Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10299230/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37367502 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11060100 |
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author | Ferreira, Mário B. Assunção, Hugo Seruti, Amanda |
author_facet | Ferreira, Mário B. Assunção, Hugo Seruti, Amanda |
author_sort | Ferreira, Mário B. |
collection | PubMed |
description | Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer–Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants’ subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer–Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10299230 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | MDPI |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-102992302023-06-28 When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy Ferreira, Mário B. Assunção, Hugo Seruti, Amanda J Intell Brief Report Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer–Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants’ subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer–Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems. MDPI 2023-05-24 /pmc/articles/PMC10299230/ /pubmed/37367502 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11060100 Text en © 2023 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Brief Report Ferreira, Mário B. Assunção, Hugo Seruti, Amanda When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy |
title | When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy |
title_full | When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy |
title_fullStr | When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy |
title_full_unstemmed | When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy |
title_short | When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy |
title_sort | when cognitive reflection leads to less overall but more systematic judgment bias: the case of the base rates fallacy |
topic | Brief Report |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10299230/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37367502 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11060100 |
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