Cargando…

When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy

Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer–Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ferreira, Mário B., Assunção, Hugo, Seruti, Amanda
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10299230/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37367502
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11060100
_version_ 1785064312688082944
author Ferreira, Mário B.
Assunção, Hugo
Seruti, Amanda
author_facet Ferreira, Mário B.
Assunção, Hugo
Seruti, Amanda
author_sort Ferreira, Mário B.
collection PubMed
description Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer–Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants’ subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer–Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-10299230
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2023
publisher MDPI
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-102992302023-06-28 When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy Ferreira, Mário B. Assunção, Hugo Seruti, Amanda J Intell Brief Report Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer–Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants’ subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer–Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems. MDPI 2023-05-24 /pmc/articles/PMC10299230/ /pubmed/37367502 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11060100 Text en © 2023 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Brief Report
Ferreira, Mário B.
Assunção, Hugo
Seruti, Amanda
When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
title When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
title_full When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
title_fullStr When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
title_full_unstemmed When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
title_short When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy
title_sort when cognitive reflection leads to less overall but more systematic judgment bias: the case of the base rates fallacy
topic Brief Report
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10299230/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37367502
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11060100
work_keys_str_mv AT ferreiramariob whencognitivereflectionleadstolessoverallbutmoresystematicjudgmentbiasthecaseofthebaseratesfallacy
AT assuncaohugo whencognitivereflectionleadstolessoverallbutmoresystematicjudgmentbiasthecaseofthebaseratesfallacy
AT serutiamanda whencognitivereflectionleadstolessoverallbutmoresystematicjudgmentbiasthecaseofthebaseratesfallacy