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A Circuit-Level Solution for Secure Temperature Sensor

Temperature sensors play an important role in modern monitoring and control applications. When more and more sensors are integrated into internet-connected systems, the integrity and security of sensors become a concern and cannot be ignored anymore. As sensors are typically low-end devices, there i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kajol, Mashrafi Alam, Monjur, Mohammad Mezanur Rahman, Yu, Qiaoyan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10305419/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37420851
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23125685
Descripción
Sumario:Temperature sensors play an important role in modern monitoring and control applications. When more and more sensors are integrated into internet-connected systems, the integrity and security of sensors become a concern and cannot be ignored anymore. As sensors are typically low-end devices, there is no built-in defense mechanism in sensors. It is common that system-level defense provides protection against security threats on sensors. Unfortunately, high-level countermeasures do not differentiate the root of cause and treat all anomalies with system-level recovery processes, resulting in high-cost overhead on delay and power consumption. In this work, we propose a secure architecture for temperature sensors with a transducer and a signal conditioning unit. The proposed architecture estimates the sensor data with statistical analysis and generates a residual signal for anomaly detection at the signal conditioning unit. Moreover, complementary current–temperature characteristics are exploited to generate a constant current reference for attack detection at the transducer level. Anomaly detection at the signal conditioning unit and attack detection at the transducer unit make the temperature sensor attack resilient to intentional and unintentional attacks. Simulation results show that our sensor is capable of detecting an under-powering attack and analog Trojan from a significant signal vibration in the constant current reference. Furthermore, the anomaly detection unit detects anomalies at the signal conditioning level from the generated residual signal. The proposed detection system is resilient against any intentional and unintentional attacks, with a detection rate of 97.73%.