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Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game
Human interactions can take the form of social dilemmas: collectively, people fare best if all cooperate but each individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows them to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperat...
Autores principales: | LaPorte, Philip, Hilbe, Christian, Nowak, Martin A. |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10337984/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37384811 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987 |
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