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Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Healthcare Fraud Supervision under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism
This study aims to provide useful insights for the Chinese government in dealing with healthcare fraud by creating an evolutionary game model that involves hospitals, third-party entities, and the government based on the government reward and punishment mechanism. This paper analyzes the evolutionar...
Autores principales: | Zhu, Change, Zhou, Lulin, Zhang, Xinjie, Walsh, Christine A. |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10341466/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37444806 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/healthcare11131972 |
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