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Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respect...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Huang, Fuyou, Liu, Bin, Tao, Baoquan, Deng, Yuankang, Ma, Chao
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10355466/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37467212
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0287982
Descripción
Sumario:With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases.