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How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task
It has been long assumed that meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) -our ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and other people- emerges around age four as indicated in performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, newer studies assessing false belief understanding wit...
Autores principales: | Haskaraca, Feride Nur, Proft, Marina, Liszkowski, Ulf, Rakoczy, Hannes |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10363613/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37492453 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1142302 |
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