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Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are easily exposed to backdoor threats when training with poisoned training samples. Models using backdoor attack have normal performance for benign samples, and possess poor performance for poisoned samples manipulated with pre-defined trigger patterns. Currently, resear...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Zhang, Shengchuan, Ye, Suhang
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10378581/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37509921
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25070974
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author Zhang, Shengchuan
Ye, Suhang
author_facet Zhang, Shengchuan
Ye, Suhang
author_sort Zhang, Shengchuan
collection PubMed
description Deep neural networks (DNNs) are easily exposed to backdoor threats when training with poisoned training samples. Models using backdoor attack have normal performance for benign samples, and possess poor performance for poisoned samples manipulated with pre-defined trigger patterns. Currently, research on backdoor attacks focuses on image classification and object detection. In this article, we investigated backdoor attacks in facial sketch synthesis, which can be beneficial for many applications, such as animation production and assisting police in searching for suspects. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective poison-only backdoor attack suitable for generation tasks. We demonstrate that when the backdoor is integrated into the target model via our attack, it can mislead the model to synthesize unacceptable sketches of any photos stamped with the trigger patterns. Extensive experiments are executed on the benchmark datasets. Specifically, the light strokes devised by our backdoor attack strategy can significantly decrease the perceptual quality. However, the FSIM score of light strokes is 68.21% on the CUFS dataset and the FSIM scores of pseudo-sketches generated by FCN, cGAN, and MDAL are 69.35%, 71.53%, and 72.75%, respectively. There is no big difference, which proves the effectiveness of the proposed backdoor attack method.
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spelling pubmed-103785812023-07-29 Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis Zhang, Shengchuan Ye, Suhang Entropy (Basel) Article Deep neural networks (DNNs) are easily exposed to backdoor threats when training with poisoned training samples. Models using backdoor attack have normal performance for benign samples, and possess poor performance for poisoned samples manipulated with pre-defined trigger patterns. Currently, research on backdoor attacks focuses on image classification and object detection. In this article, we investigated backdoor attacks in facial sketch synthesis, which can be beneficial for many applications, such as animation production and assisting police in searching for suspects. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective poison-only backdoor attack suitable for generation tasks. We demonstrate that when the backdoor is integrated into the target model via our attack, it can mislead the model to synthesize unacceptable sketches of any photos stamped with the trigger patterns. Extensive experiments are executed on the benchmark datasets. Specifically, the light strokes devised by our backdoor attack strategy can significantly decrease the perceptual quality. However, the FSIM score of light strokes is 68.21% on the CUFS dataset and the FSIM scores of pseudo-sketches generated by FCN, cGAN, and MDAL are 69.35%, 71.53%, and 72.75%, respectively. There is no big difference, which proves the effectiveness of the proposed backdoor attack method. MDPI 2023-06-25 /pmc/articles/PMC10378581/ /pubmed/37509921 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25070974 Text en © 2023 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Zhang, Shengchuan
Ye, Suhang
Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis
title Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis
title_full Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis
title_fullStr Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis
title_full_unstemmed Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis
title_short Backdoor Attack against Face Sketch Synthesis
title_sort backdoor attack against face sketch synthesis
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10378581/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37509921
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25070974
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