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Encryption in phase space for classical coherent optical communications
Optical layer attacks on optical fiber communication networks are one of the weakest reinforced areas of the network, allowing attackers to overcome security software or firewalls when proper safeguards are not put into place. Encrypting data using a random phase mask is a simple yet effective way t...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10415392/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37563146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-39621-5 |
Sumario: | Optical layer attacks on optical fiber communication networks are one of the weakest reinforced areas of the network, allowing attackers to overcome security software or firewalls when proper safeguards are not put into place. Encrypting data using a random phase mask is a simple yet effective way to bolster the data security at the physical layer. Since the interactions of the random phases used for such encryption heavily depend on system properties like data rate, modulation format, distance, degree of phase randomness, laser properties, etc., it is important to determine the optimum operating conditions for different scenarios. In this work, assuming that the transmitter and the receiver have a secret pre-shared key, we present a theoretical study of security in such a system through mutual information analysis. Next, we determine operating conditions which ensure security for 4-PSK, 16-PSK, and 128-QAM formats through numerical simulation. Moreover, we provide an experimental demonstration of the system using 16-QAM modulation. We then use numerical simulation to verify the efficacy of the encryption and study two preventative measures for different modulation formats which will prevent an eavesdropper from obtaining any data. The results demonstrate that the system is secure against a tapping attack if an attacker has no information of the phase modulator and pre-shared key. |
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