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Self-interested learning is more important than fair-minded conditional cooperation in public-goods games
Why does human cooperation often unravel in economic experiments despite a promising start? Previous studies have interpreted the decline as the reaction of disappointed altruists retaliating in response to non-altruists (Conditional Cooperators hypothesis). This interpretation has been considered e...
Autores principales: | Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N., Guérin, Claire |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10426038/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37588915 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ehs.2022.45 |
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