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Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes
The security of digital signatures depends significantly on the signature key. Therefore, to reduce the impact of leaked keys upon existing signatures and subsequent ones, a digital signature scheme with strong forward security could be an effective solution. Most existing strong forward-secure digi...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10453694/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37628189 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25081159 |
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author | Li, Fengyin Wang, Junhui Shang, Mengxue Zhang, Dandan Li, Tao |
author_facet | Li, Fengyin Wang, Junhui Shang, Mengxue Zhang, Dandan Li, Tao |
author_sort | Li, Fengyin |
collection | PubMed |
description | The security of digital signatures depends significantly on the signature key. Therefore, to reduce the impact of leaked keys upon existing signatures and subsequent ones, a digital signature scheme with strong forward security could be an effective solution. Most existing strong forward-secure digital signature schemes rely on traditional cryptosystems, which cannot effectively resist quantum attacks. By introducing lattice-based delegation technology into the key-iteration process, a two-direction and lattice-based key-iteration algorithm with strong forward security is proposed. In the proposed algorithm, a unique key pair is assigned to the signer in every period. Based on the proposed algorithm, a strong forward-secure signature scheme is further put forward, which achieves resistance to quantum attacks. Performance analysis shows that under the security assumption of the SIS problem on the lattice, the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under the random oracle model. Ultimately, based on the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme, a remote identity-authentication scheme that is resistant to quantum attacks is proposed, ensuring post-quantum security in the user-authentication process. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10453694 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | MDPI |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-104536942023-08-26 Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes Li, Fengyin Wang, Junhui Shang, Mengxue Zhang, Dandan Li, Tao Entropy (Basel) Article The security of digital signatures depends significantly on the signature key. Therefore, to reduce the impact of leaked keys upon existing signatures and subsequent ones, a digital signature scheme with strong forward security could be an effective solution. Most existing strong forward-secure digital signature schemes rely on traditional cryptosystems, which cannot effectively resist quantum attacks. By introducing lattice-based delegation technology into the key-iteration process, a two-direction and lattice-based key-iteration algorithm with strong forward security is proposed. In the proposed algorithm, a unique key pair is assigned to the signer in every period. Based on the proposed algorithm, a strong forward-secure signature scheme is further put forward, which achieves resistance to quantum attacks. Performance analysis shows that under the security assumption of the SIS problem on the lattice, the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under the random oracle model. Ultimately, based on the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme, a remote identity-authentication scheme that is resistant to quantum attacks is proposed, ensuring post-quantum security in the user-authentication process. MDPI 2023-08-02 /pmc/articles/PMC10453694/ /pubmed/37628189 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25081159 Text en © 2023 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Li, Fengyin Wang, Junhui Shang, Mengxue Zhang, Dandan Li, Tao Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes |
title | Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes |
title_full | Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes |
title_fullStr | Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes |
title_full_unstemmed | Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes |
title_short | Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes |
title_sort | research on quantum-attack-resistant strong forward-secure signature schemes |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10453694/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37628189 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25081159 |
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