Mistaken information can lead only to misguided conclusions and policies: a commentary regarding Schüz et al.’s response

BACKGROUND: After reviewing selected scientific evidence, Schüz et al. made two recommendations in the 2018 International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) Technical Publication No. 46. Their first recommendation was against population thyroid screening after a nuclear accident, and the second was that consideration be given to offering a long-term thyroid monitoring program for higher-risk individuals (100–500 mGy or more radiation) after a nuclear accident. However, their review of the scientific evidence was inadequate and misrepresented the information from both Chernobyl and Fukushima. We wrote a review article published in Environmental Health in 2022 using the “Toolkit for detecting misused epidemiological methods.” Schüz et al. critiqued our 2022 review article in 2023; their critique, based also on their 2018 IARC Technical Publication No. 46, was so fraught with problems that we developed this response. MAIN BODY: Schüz et al. suggest that hundreds of thyroid cancer cases in children and adolescents, detected through population thyroid examinations using ultrasound echo and conducted since October 2011 in Fukushima, were not caused by the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. Schüz et al. compared thyroid cancers in Fukushima directly with those in Chernobyl after April 1986 and listed up to five reasons to deny a causal relationship between radiation and thyroid cancers in Fukushima; however, those reasons we dismiss based on available evidence. No new scientific evidence was presented in their response to our commentary in which we pointed out that misinformation and biased scientific evidence had formed the basis of their arguments. Their published article provided erroneous information on Fukushima. The article implied overdiagnosis in adults and suggested that overdiagnosis would apply to current Fukushima cases. The IARC report did not validate the secondary confirmatory examination in the program which obscures the fact that overdiagnosis may not have occurred as much in Fukushima. The report consequently precluded the provision of important information and measures. CONCLUSION: Information provided in the IARC Technical Publication No. 46 was based on selected scientific evidence resulting in both public and policy-maker confusion regarding past and present nuclear accidents, especially in Japan. It should be withdrawn.