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Honor in the Wild: Virtuous Violence between the Hobbesian Trap and Social Order

“Culture of honor” means that individuals deter others by signaling their commitment to violent retaliation. We develop a multilevel explanation of cross-level interdependence of honor and violence. According to our concept of system-level honor, a social system is loaded with deterrence signaling i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Windzio, Michael, Baier, Dirk
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10543791/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37672175
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-023-09455-1
Descripción
Sumario:“Culture of honor” means that individuals deter others by signaling their commitment to violent retaliation. We develop a multilevel explanation of cross-level interdependence of honor and violence. According to our concept of system-level honor, a social system is loaded with deterrence signaling if culture of honor is highly prevalent in the system. In line with the Smith and Price (1973, in Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/246015a0) model, we argue that high system-level honor discourages Prober-Retaliator behavior: some individuals might tend to challenge others they assume to be inferior to increase their own reputation. Both individual culture of honor and system-level honor contribute to an increase in violence (H1; H2). However, as system-level honor and deterrence become more prevalent, the impact of individual honor diminishes because engaging in violent behavior becomes increasingly expensive within such a system (H3). As a second contextual effect, inequality in culture of honor should therefore increase violent behavior because it encourages Prober-Retaliator behavior (H4). We analyze the effect of culture of honor on school violence among 15-year-old adolescents. Disentangling the micro- and context-level effects of culture of honor on violent behavior in a multilevel analysis framework allows the estimation of a cross-level interaction using a large data set from more than 25,000 adolescents in more than 1,300 schoolroom contexts. Results are in line with our H3, but not with H4. Model-based predictions show that the deterrent effect must be unrealistically high to generate an equilibrium of average violence.