Cargando…
Pricing Treatments Cost-Effectively when They Have Multiple Indications: Not Just a Simple Threshold Analysis
BACKGROUND: Economic evaluations of treatments increasingly employ price-threshold analyses. When a treatment has multiple indications, standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic. We examine how rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based...
Autores principales: | , |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
SAGE Publications
2023
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10625719/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37698120 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989X231197772 |
Sumario: | BACKGROUND: Economic evaluations of treatments increasingly employ price-threshold analyses. When a treatment has multiple indications, standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic. We examine how rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based price analyses. METHODS: We analyze a 2-stage game between 2 players: the therapy’s manufacturer and the payer purchasing it for patients. First, the manufacturer selects a price(s) that may be indication specific. Then, the payer decides whether to provide reimbursement at the offered price(s). We assume known indication-specific demand. The manufacturer seeks to maximize profit. The payer seeks to maximize total population incremental net monetary benefit and will not pay more than their willingness-to-pay threshold. We consider game variants defined by constraints on the manufacturer’s ability to price and payer’s ability to provide reimbursement differentially by indication. RESULTS: When both the manufacturer and payer can make indication-specific decisions, the problem simplifies to multiple single-indication price-threshold analyses, and the manufacturer captures all the consumer surplus. When the manufacturer is restricted to one price and the payer must make an all-or-nothing reimbursement decision, the selected price is a weighted average of indication-specific threshold prices such that reimbursement of more valuable indications subsidizes reimbursement of less valuable indications. With a single price and indication-specific coverage decisions, the manufacturer may select a high price where fewer patients receive treatment because the payer restricts reimbursement to the set of indications providing value commensurate with the high price. However, the manufacturer may select a low price, resulting in reimbursement for more indications and positive consumer surplus. CONCLUSIONS: When treatments have multiple indications, economic evaluations including price-threshold analyses should carefully consider jurisdiction-specific rules regarding pricing and reimbursement decisions. HIGHLIGHTS: With treatment prices rising, economic evaluations increasingly employ price-threshold analyses to identify value-based prices. Standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic when treatments have multiple indications. Jurisdiction-specific rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based price analyses. When the manufacturer is restricted to one price for all indications and the payer must make an all-or-nothing reimbursement decision, the selected price is a weighted average of indication-specific threshold prices such that reimbursement of the more valuable indications subsidize reimbursement of the less valuable indications. With a single price and indication-specific coverage decisions, the manufacturer may select a high price with fewer patients treated than in the first-best solution. There are also cases in which the manufacturer selects a lower price, resulting in reimbursement for more indications and positive consumer surplus. |
---|