Supply chain decision based on green investment subsidy and risk aversion

Considering the risk aversion characteristics of supply chain members, how to effectively design the government subsidy strategy and green supply chain strategy is a realistic and urgent issue. Regarding this, we optimize and compare four three-stage Stackelberg game models between government and a two-echelon green supply chain, namely both manufacturer and retailer risk neutral (BN), manufacturer risk aversion while retailer risk neutral (MA), retailer risk aversion while manufacturer risk neutral (RA) and both manufacturer and retailer risk aversion (BA). The government as the leader decides the subsidy rate of green input cost with the goal of maximizing social welfare; the manufacturer as the first follower makes decisions on product greenness and wholesale price to maximize its own interests; and the retailer as the second follower determines retail prices to maximize its own interests. Employing mathematical reasoning and numerical simulation investigate thoroughly the effects of the government subsidies and the members’ risk aversion. Results indicate that an appropriate government subsidy investment has a positive effect on optimal decisions and related benefits. Risk aversion is in favor of improvement of product greenness and social welfare while reduction of retail price. With the increase of manufacturer risk aversion, green subsidy investment rate and retailer expected revenue increase; on the contrary, the wholesale price and manufacturer expected revenue decrease. With the increase of retailer risk aversion, the wholesale price and manufacturer expected revenue increase, while green subsidy investment rate and retailer expected revenue decrease. In the model of BN, product greenness and social welfare are the lowest, while retail price is the highest. BA is opposite to BN. In the model of RA, green subsidy investment rate and retailer expected revenue the lowest, while wholesale price and manufacturer expected revenue the highest. RA is opposite to MA. The government should formulate appropriate subsidy policies to encourage manufacturers to produce green products and raise consumers’ green awareness. Enterprises should control their own risk aversion and assess the risk aversion of the other party reasonably.