Risk-taking, loss aversion, and performance feedback in dynamic and heterogeneous tournaments

Within the context of professional football, we examined the impact of the interim game state on risk-taking and performance during a dynamic tournament. This study used 9,256 segments from the top five European football leagues as samples. These segments were derived from 1,826 games played during the 2017–2018 season. Poisson regression was employed to analyze the distinct effects of game state and heterogeneity on performance under pressure. The results indicated that stronger teams tended to increase their attack intensity when facing weaker opponents. However, as their lead expanded, they tended to reduce their attack intensity, particularly in matches with heterogeneous characteristics. Moreover, teams trailing in scores tended to intensify their attacks but achieved little. However, leading teams consistently underperformed in terms of blocked shots and corner kicks. Additionally, tied teams systematically exhibited lower performance in shots on target and free kicks compared to leading teams, despite having a higher motivation to excel. These findings extend our understanding of how risk-taking and performance depend on disclosing information regarding relative performance.