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An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation
This study analyzes the impact of public participation on the choice of third-party evaluators' behavior strategies during the service quality supervision process of China's pension public–private partnership project. An evolutionary game model between third-party evaluators and government...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2023
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10667543/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37996481 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-47369-1 |
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author | Yue, Xianghua Durrani, Shahzad Khan Zhao, Shikuan Li, Fuda |
author_facet | Yue, Xianghua Durrani, Shahzad Khan Zhao, Shikuan Li, Fuda |
author_sort | Yue, Xianghua |
collection | PubMed |
description | This study analyzes the impact of public participation on the choice of third-party evaluators' behavior strategies during the service quality supervision process of China's pension public–private partnership project. An evolutionary game model between third-party evaluators and government regulators is developed, wherein the evolution rule of the two sides and public participation’s influence on their behavior under the two different conditions are analyzed, and a numerical simulation is carried out using MATLAB 2016a. It is found that third-party evaluators may choose the false evaluation strategy without public participation because of the inducement of rent-seeking or insufficient government punishment when the regulatory revenue of the government regulatory agencies is less than the regulatory cost. In contrast, in the case of public participation, the true evaluation strategy is chosen with an improvement in the level of public participation or an increase in reputation incentive. This suggests the construction and improvement of a third-party evaluation system, which shows that the construction of the service quality supervision system in China’s pension PPP project has a large operating space. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-10667543 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | Nature Publishing Group UK |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-106675432023-11-23 An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation Yue, Xianghua Durrani, Shahzad Khan Zhao, Shikuan Li, Fuda Sci Rep Article This study analyzes the impact of public participation on the choice of third-party evaluators' behavior strategies during the service quality supervision process of China's pension public–private partnership project. An evolutionary game model between third-party evaluators and government regulators is developed, wherein the evolution rule of the two sides and public participation’s influence on their behavior under the two different conditions are analyzed, and a numerical simulation is carried out using MATLAB 2016a. It is found that third-party evaluators may choose the false evaluation strategy without public participation because of the inducement of rent-seeking or insufficient government punishment when the regulatory revenue of the government regulatory agencies is less than the regulatory cost. In contrast, in the case of public participation, the true evaluation strategy is chosen with an improvement in the level of public participation or an increase in reputation incentive. This suggests the construction and improvement of a third-party evaluation system, which shows that the construction of the service quality supervision system in China’s pension PPP project has a large operating space. Nature Publishing Group UK 2023-11-23 /pmc/articles/PMC10667543/ /pubmed/37996481 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-47369-1 Text en © The Author(s) 2023 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Article Yue, Xianghua Durrani, Shahzad Khan Zhao, Shikuan Li, Fuda An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
title | An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
title_full | An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
title_fullStr | An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
title_full_unstemmed | An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
title_short | An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
title_sort | evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public–private partnership incorporating public participation |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10667543/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37996481 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-47369-1 |
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