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Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station

True randomness is necessary for the security of any cryptographic protocol, including quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD transceivers, randomness is supplied by one or more local, private entropy sources of quantum origin which can be either passive (e.g., a beam splitter) or active (e.g., an e...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Stipčević, Mario
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10670559/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37998210
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25111518
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author Stipčević, Mario
author_facet Stipčević, Mario
author_sort Stipčević, Mario
collection PubMed
description True randomness is necessary for the security of any cryptographic protocol, including quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD transceivers, randomness is supplied by one or more local, private entropy sources of quantum origin which can be either passive (e.g., a beam splitter) or active (e.g., an electronic quantum random number generator). In order to better understand the role of randomness in QKD, I revisit the well-known “detector blinding” attack on the BB84 QKD protocol, which utilizes strong light to achieve undetectable and complete recovery of the secret key. I present two findings. First, I show that the detector-blinding attack was in fact an attack on the receiver’s local entropy source. Second, based on this insight, I propose a modified receiver station and a statistical criterion which together enable the robust detection of any bright-light attack and thus restore security.
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spelling pubmed-106705592023-11-06 Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station Stipčević, Mario Entropy (Basel) Article True randomness is necessary for the security of any cryptographic protocol, including quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD transceivers, randomness is supplied by one or more local, private entropy sources of quantum origin which can be either passive (e.g., a beam splitter) or active (e.g., an electronic quantum random number generator). In order to better understand the role of randomness in QKD, I revisit the well-known “detector blinding” attack on the BB84 QKD protocol, which utilizes strong light to achieve undetectable and complete recovery of the secret key. I present two findings. First, I show that the detector-blinding attack was in fact an attack on the receiver’s local entropy source. Second, based on this insight, I propose a modified receiver station and a statistical criterion which together enable the robust detection of any bright-light attack and thus restore security. MDPI 2023-11-06 /pmc/articles/PMC10670559/ /pubmed/37998210 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25111518 Text en © 2023 by the author. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Stipčević, Mario
Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station
title Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station
title_full Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station
title_fullStr Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station
title_full_unstemmed Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station
title_short Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station
title_sort enhancing the security of the bb84 quantum key distribution protocol against detector-blinding attacks via the use of an active quantum entropy source in the receiving station
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10670559/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37998210
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25111518
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