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Causal criteria and counterfactuals; nothing more (or less) than scientific common sense
Two persistent myths in epidemiology are that we can use a list of "causal criteria" to provide an algorithmic approach to inferring causation and that a modern "counterfactual model" can assist in the same endeavor. We argue that these are neither criteria nor a model, but that...
Autores principales: | Phillips, Carl V, Goodman, Karen J |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
BioMed Central
2006
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1488839/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16725053 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1742-7622-3-5 |
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