Cargando…

Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research

One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Manninen, Bertha Alvarez
Formato: Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2263072/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18237425
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-3-4
_version_ 1782151441708744704
author Manninen, Bertha Alvarez
author_facet Manninen, Bertha Alvarez
author_sort Manninen, Bertha Alvarez
collection PubMed
description One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves. This argument assumes two points that are rather contentious given a Kantian framework. First, the argument assumes that when Kant maintains that humanity must be treated as an end in itself, he means to argue that all members of the species Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in themselves; that is, that Kant regards personhood as co-extensive with belonging to the species Homo sapiens. Second, the argument assumes that the event of conception is causally responsible for the genesis of a Kantian person and that, therefore, an embryo is a Kantian person from the time of its conception. In this paper, I will present challenges against these two assumptions by engaging in an exegetical study of some of Kant's works. First, I will illustrate that Kant did not use the term "humanity" to denote a biological species, but rather the capacity to set ends according to reason. Second, I will illustrate that it is difficult given a Kantian framework to denote conception (indeed any biological event) as causally responsible for the creation of a person. Kant ascribed to a dualistic view of human agency, and personhood, according to him, was derived from the supersensible capacity for reason. To argue that a Kantian person is generated due to the event of conception ignores Kant's insistence in various aspects of his work that it is not possible to understand the generation of a person qua a physical operation. Finally, I will end the paper by drawing from Allen Wood's work in Kantian philosophy in order to generate an argument in favor of hESCR.
format Text
id pubmed-2263072
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2008
publisher BioMed Central
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-22630722008-03-06 Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research Manninen, Bertha Alvarez Philos Ethics Humanit Med Research One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves. This argument assumes two points that are rather contentious given a Kantian framework. First, the argument assumes that when Kant maintains that humanity must be treated as an end in itself, he means to argue that all members of the species Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in themselves; that is, that Kant regards personhood as co-extensive with belonging to the species Homo sapiens. Second, the argument assumes that the event of conception is causally responsible for the genesis of a Kantian person and that, therefore, an embryo is a Kantian person from the time of its conception. In this paper, I will present challenges against these two assumptions by engaging in an exegetical study of some of Kant's works. First, I will illustrate that Kant did not use the term "humanity" to denote a biological species, but rather the capacity to set ends according to reason. Second, I will illustrate that it is difficult given a Kantian framework to denote conception (indeed any biological event) as causally responsible for the creation of a person. Kant ascribed to a dualistic view of human agency, and personhood, according to him, was derived from the supersensible capacity for reason. To argue that a Kantian person is generated due to the event of conception ignores Kant's insistence in various aspects of his work that it is not possible to understand the generation of a person qua a physical operation. Finally, I will end the paper by drawing from Allen Wood's work in Kantian philosophy in order to generate an argument in favor of hESCR. BioMed Central 2008-01-31 /pmc/articles/PMC2263072/ /pubmed/18237425 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-3-4 Text en Copyright © 2008 Manninen; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0) ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Research
Manninen, Bertha Alvarez
Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
title Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
title_full Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
title_fullStr Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
title_full_unstemmed Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
title_short Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
title_sort are human embryos kantian persons?: kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research
topic Research
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2263072/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18237425
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-3-4
work_keys_str_mv AT manninenberthaalvarez arehumanembryoskantianpersonskantianconsiderationsinfavorofembryonicstemcellresearch