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Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew
BACKGROUND: Knowledge of the geographical locations of individuals is fundamental to the practice of spatial epidemiology. One approach to preserving the privacy of individual-level addresses in a data set is to de-identify the data using a non-deterministic blurring algorithm that shifts the geocod...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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BioMed Central
2008
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2526988/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18700031 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1476-072X-7-45 |
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author | Cassa, Christopher A Wieland, Shannon C Mandl, Kenneth D |
author_facet | Cassa, Christopher A Wieland, Shannon C Mandl, Kenneth D |
author_sort | Cassa, Christopher A |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: Knowledge of the geographical locations of individuals is fundamental to the practice of spatial epidemiology. One approach to preserving the privacy of individual-level addresses in a data set is to de-identify the data using a non-deterministic blurring algorithm that shifts the geocoded values. We investigate a vulnerability in this approach which enables an adversary to re-identify individuals using multiple anonymized versions of the original data set. If several such versions are available, each can be used to incrementally refine estimates of the original geocoded location. RESULTS: We produce multiple anonymized data sets using a single set of addresses and then progressively average the anonymized results related to each address, characterizing the steep decline in distance from the re-identified point to the original location, (and the reduction in privacy). With ten anonymized copies of an original data set, we find a substantial decrease in average distance from 0.7 km to 0.2 km between the estimated, re-identified address and the original address. With fifty anonymized copies of an original data set, we find a decrease in average distance from 0.7 km to 0.1 km. CONCLUSION: We demonstrate that multiple versions of the same data, each anonymized by non-deterministic Gaussian skew, can be used to ascertain original geographic locations. We explore solutions to this problem that include infrastructure to support the safe disclosure of anonymized medical data to prevent inference or re-identification of original address data, and the use of a Markov-process based algorithm to mitigate this risk. |
format | Text |
id | pubmed-2526988 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2008 |
publisher | BioMed Central |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-25269882008-08-29 Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew Cassa, Christopher A Wieland, Shannon C Mandl, Kenneth D Int J Health Geogr Research BACKGROUND: Knowledge of the geographical locations of individuals is fundamental to the practice of spatial epidemiology. One approach to preserving the privacy of individual-level addresses in a data set is to de-identify the data using a non-deterministic blurring algorithm that shifts the geocoded values. We investigate a vulnerability in this approach which enables an adversary to re-identify individuals using multiple anonymized versions of the original data set. If several such versions are available, each can be used to incrementally refine estimates of the original geocoded location. RESULTS: We produce multiple anonymized data sets using a single set of addresses and then progressively average the anonymized results related to each address, characterizing the steep decline in distance from the re-identified point to the original location, (and the reduction in privacy). With ten anonymized copies of an original data set, we find a substantial decrease in average distance from 0.7 km to 0.2 km between the estimated, re-identified address and the original address. With fifty anonymized copies of an original data set, we find a decrease in average distance from 0.7 km to 0.1 km. CONCLUSION: We demonstrate that multiple versions of the same data, each anonymized by non-deterministic Gaussian skew, can be used to ascertain original geographic locations. We explore solutions to this problem that include infrastructure to support the safe disclosure of anonymized medical data to prevent inference or re-identification of original address data, and the use of a Markov-process based algorithm to mitigate this risk. BioMed Central 2008-08-12 /pmc/articles/PMC2526988/ /pubmed/18700031 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1476-072X-7-45 Text en Copyright © 2008 Cassa et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0) ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Research Cassa, Christopher A Wieland, Shannon C Mandl, Kenneth D Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew |
title | Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew |
title_full | Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew |
title_fullStr | Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew |
title_full_unstemmed | Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew |
title_short | Re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by Gaussian skew |
title_sort | re-identification of home addresses from spatial locations anonymized by gaussian skew |
topic | Research |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2526988/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18700031 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1476-072X-7-45 |
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