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Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity
The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer-Verlag
2008
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2574888/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18386099 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6 |
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author | Traulsen, Arne Shoresh, Noam Nowak, Martin A. |
author_facet | Traulsen, Arne Shoresh, Noam Nowak, Martin A. |
author_sort | Traulsen, Arne |
collection | PubMed |
description | The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory. |
format | Text |
id | pubmed-2574888 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2008 |
publisher | Springer-Verlag |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-25748882008-10-28 Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity Traulsen, Arne Shoresh, Noam Nowak, Martin A. Bull Math Biol Original Article The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory. Springer-Verlag 2008-04-02 2008 /pmc/articles/PMC2574888/ /pubmed/18386099 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6 Text en © The Author(s) 2008 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Original Article Traulsen, Arne Shoresh, Noam Nowak, Martin A. Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
title | Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
title_full | Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
title_fullStr | Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
title_full_unstemmed | Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
title_short | Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
title_sort | analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity |
topic | Original Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2574888/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18386099 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6 |
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