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Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50%...
Autores principales: | Meltzer, M I, Damon, I, LeDuc, J W, Millar, J D |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2001
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2631899/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11747722 |
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