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Does risk equalization reduce the viability of voluntary deductibles?
Theoretically, a risk avers consumer takes a deductible if the premium rebate (far) exceeds his/her expected out-of-pocket expenditures. In the absence of risk equalization, insurers are able to offer high rebates because those who select into a deductible plan have below-average expenses. This pape...
Autores principales: | van Kleef, R. C., Beck, K., van de Ven, W. P. M. M., van Vliet, R. C. J. A. |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer-Verlag
2007
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2784522/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17431767 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10754-007-9011-1 |
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