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Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)

BACKGROUND: Clearly air travel, by transporting infectious individuals from one geographic location to another, significantly affects the rate of spread of influenza A (H1N1). However, the possibility of within-flight transmission of H1N1 has not been evaluated; although it is known that smallpox, m...

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Autores principales: Wagner, Bradley G, Coburn, Brian J, Blower, Sally
Formato: Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2009
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2813231/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20034378
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1741-7015-7-81
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author Wagner, Bradley G
Coburn, Brian J
Blower, Sally
author_facet Wagner, Bradley G
Coburn, Brian J
Blower, Sally
author_sort Wagner, Bradley G
collection PubMed
description BACKGROUND: Clearly air travel, by transporting infectious individuals from one geographic location to another, significantly affects the rate of spread of influenza A (H1N1). However, the possibility of within-flight transmission of H1N1 has not been evaluated; although it is known that smallpox, measles, tuberculosis, SARS and seasonal influenza can be transmitted during commercial flights. Here we present the first quantitative risk assessment to assess the potential for within-flight transmission of H1N1. METHODS: We model airborne transmission of infectious viral particles of H1N1 within a Boeing 747 using methodology from the field of quantitative microbial risk assessment. RESULTS: The risk of catching H1N1 will essentially be confined to passengers travelling in the same cabin as the source case. Not surprisingly, we find that the longer the flight the greater the number of infections that can be expected. We calculate that H1N1, even during long flights, poses a low to moderate within-flight transmission risk if the source case travels First Class. Specifically, 0-1 infections could occur during a 5 hour flight, 1-3 during an 11 hour flight and 2-5 during a 17 hour flight. However, within-flight transmission could be significant, particularly during long flights, if the source case travels in Economy Class. Specifically, two to five infections could occur during a 5 hour flight, 5-10 during an 11 hour flight and 7-17 during a 17 hour flight. If the aircraft is only partially loaded, under certain conditions more infections could occur in First Class than in Economy Class. During a 17 hour flight, a greater number of infections would occur in First Class than in Economy if the First Class Cabin is fully occupied, but Economy class is less than 30% full. CONCLUSIONS: Our results provide insights into the potential utility of air travel restrictions on controlling influenza pandemics in the winter of 2009/2010. They show travel by one infectious individual, rather than causing a single outbreak of H1N1, could cause several simultaneous outbreaks. These results imply that, during a pandemic, quarantining passengers who travel in Economy on long-haul flights could potentially be an important control strategy. Notably, our results show that quarantining passengers who travel First Class would be unlikely to be an effective control strategy.
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spelling pubmed-28132312010-01-29 Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1) Wagner, Bradley G Coburn, Brian J Blower, Sally BMC Med Correspondence BACKGROUND: Clearly air travel, by transporting infectious individuals from one geographic location to another, significantly affects the rate of spread of influenza A (H1N1). However, the possibility of within-flight transmission of H1N1 has not been evaluated; although it is known that smallpox, measles, tuberculosis, SARS and seasonal influenza can be transmitted during commercial flights. Here we present the first quantitative risk assessment to assess the potential for within-flight transmission of H1N1. METHODS: We model airborne transmission of infectious viral particles of H1N1 within a Boeing 747 using methodology from the field of quantitative microbial risk assessment. RESULTS: The risk of catching H1N1 will essentially be confined to passengers travelling in the same cabin as the source case. Not surprisingly, we find that the longer the flight the greater the number of infections that can be expected. We calculate that H1N1, even during long flights, poses a low to moderate within-flight transmission risk if the source case travels First Class. Specifically, 0-1 infections could occur during a 5 hour flight, 1-3 during an 11 hour flight and 2-5 during a 17 hour flight. However, within-flight transmission could be significant, particularly during long flights, if the source case travels in Economy Class. Specifically, two to five infections could occur during a 5 hour flight, 5-10 during an 11 hour flight and 7-17 during a 17 hour flight. If the aircraft is only partially loaded, under certain conditions more infections could occur in First Class than in Economy Class. During a 17 hour flight, a greater number of infections would occur in First Class than in Economy if the First Class Cabin is fully occupied, but Economy class is less than 30% full. CONCLUSIONS: Our results provide insights into the potential utility of air travel restrictions on controlling influenza pandemics in the winter of 2009/2010. They show travel by one infectious individual, rather than causing a single outbreak of H1N1, could cause several simultaneous outbreaks. These results imply that, during a pandemic, quarantining passengers who travel in Economy on long-haul flights could potentially be an important control strategy. Notably, our results show that quarantining passengers who travel First Class would be unlikely to be an effective control strategy. BioMed Central 2009-12-24 /pmc/articles/PMC2813231/ /pubmed/20034378 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1741-7015-7-81 Text en Copyright ©2009 Wagner et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Correspondence
Wagner, Bradley G
Coburn, Brian J
Blower, Sally
Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)
title Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)
title_full Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)
title_fullStr Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)
title_full_unstemmed Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)
title_short Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)
title_sort calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza a (h1n1)
topic Correspondence
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2813231/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20034378
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1741-7015-7-81
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