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Cooperation and Stability through Periodic Impulses
Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual coop...
Autores principales: | Zhang, Bo-Yu, Cressman, Ross, Tao, Yi |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2010
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2848027/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20369003 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0009882 |
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