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Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction...
Autores principales: | Helbing, Dirk, Szolnoki, Attila, Perc, Matjaž, Szabó, György |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2010
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2861625/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20454464 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758 |
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