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Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of...
Autores principales: | , , , , , , , , |
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Formato: | Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2003
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2972753/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15207032 http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0905.020388 |
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author | Ashford, David A. Kaiser, Robyn M. Bales, Michael E. Shutt, Kathleen Patrawalla, Amee McShan, Andre Tappero, Jordan W. Perkins, Bradley A. Dannenberg, Andrew L. |
author_facet | Ashford, David A. Kaiser, Robyn M. Bales, Michael E. Shutt, Kathleen Patrawalla, Amee McShan, Andre Tappero, Jordan W. Perkins, Bradley A. Dannenberg, Andrew L. |
author_sort | Ashford, David A. |
collection | PubMed |
description | We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of infectious agents was considered. Healthcare providers reported 270 (24.6%) outbreaks and infection control practitioners reported 129 (11.7%); together they reported 399 (36.3%) of the outbreaks. Health departments reported 335 (30.5%) outbreaks. For six outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was possible, reporting was delayed for up to 26 days. We confirmed that the most critical component for bioterrorism outbreak detection and reporting is the frontline healthcare profession and the local health departments. Bioterrorism preparedness should emphasize education and support of this frontline as well as methods to shorten the time between outbreak and reporting. |
format | Text |
id | pubmed-2972753 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2003 |
publisher | Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-29727532010-11-12 Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations Ashford, David A. Kaiser, Robyn M. Bales, Michael E. Shutt, Kathleen Patrawalla, Amee McShan, Andre Tappero, Jordan W. Perkins, Bradley A. Dannenberg, Andrew L. Emerg Infect Dis Perspective We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of infectious agents was considered. Healthcare providers reported 270 (24.6%) outbreaks and infection control practitioners reported 129 (11.7%); together they reported 399 (36.3%) of the outbreaks. Health departments reported 335 (30.5%) outbreaks. For six outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was possible, reporting was delayed for up to 26 days. We confirmed that the most critical component for bioterrorism outbreak detection and reporting is the frontline healthcare profession and the local health departments. Bioterrorism preparedness should emphasize education and support of this frontline as well as methods to shorten the time between outbreak and reporting. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003-05 /pmc/articles/PMC2972753/ /pubmed/15207032 http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0905.020388 Text en https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is a publication of the U.S. Government. This publication is in the public domain and is therefore without copyright. All text from this work may be reprinted freely. Use of these materials should be properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Perspective Ashford, David A. Kaiser, Robyn M. Bales, Michael E. Shutt, Kathleen Patrawalla, Amee McShan, Andre Tappero, Jordan W. Perkins, Bradley A. Dannenberg, Andrew L. Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations |
title | Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations |
title_full | Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations |
title_fullStr | Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations |
title_full_unstemmed | Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations |
title_short | Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations |
title_sort | planning against biological terrorism: lessons from outbreak investigations |
topic | Perspective |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2972753/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15207032 http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0905.020388 |
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