Cargando…

Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations

We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ashford, David A., Kaiser, Robyn M., Bales, Michael E., Shutt, Kathleen, Patrawalla, Amee, McShan, Andre, Tappero, Jordan W., Perkins, Bradley A., Dannenberg, Andrew L.
Formato: Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2972753/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15207032
http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0905.020388
_version_ 1782190829251592192
author Ashford, David A.
Kaiser, Robyn M.
Bales, Michael E.
Shutt, Kathleen
Patrawalla, Amee
McShan, Andre
Tappero, Jordan W.
Perkins, Bradley A.
Dannenberg, Andrew L.
author_facet Ashford, David A.
Kaiser, Robyn M.
Bales, Michael E.
Shutt, Kathleen
Patrawalla, Amee
McShan, Andre
Tappero, Jordan W.
Perkins, Bradley A.
Dannenberg, Andrew L.
author_sort Ashford, David A.
collection PubMed
description We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of infectious agents was considered. Healthcare providers reported 270 (24.6%) outbreaks and infection control practitioners reported 129 (11.7%); together they reported 399 (36.3%) of the outbreaks. Health departments reported 335 (30.5%) outbreaks. For six outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was possible, reporting was delayed for up to 26 days. We confirmed that the most critical component for bioterrorism outbreak detection and reporting is the frontline healthcare profession and the local health departments. Bioterrorism preparedness should emphasize education and support of this frontline as well as methods to shorten the time between outbreak and reporting.
format Text
id pubmed-2972753
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2003
publisher Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-29727532010-11-12 Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations Ashford, David A. Kaiser, Robyn M. Bales, Michael E. Shutt, Kathleen Patrawalla, Amee McShan, Andre Tappero, Jordan W. Perkins, Bradley A. Dannenberg, Andrew L. Emerg Infect Dis Perspective We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of infectious agents was considered. Healthcare providers reported 270 (24.6%) outbreaks and infection control practitioners reported 129 (11.7%); together they reported 399 (36.3%) of the outbreaks. Health departments reported 335 (30.5%) outbreaks. For six outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was possible, reporting was delayed for up to 26 days. We confirmed that the most critical component for bioterrorism outbreak detection and reporting is the frontline healthcare profession and the local health departments. Bioterrorism preparedness should emphasize education and support of this frontline as well as methods to shorten the time between outbreak and reporting. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003-05 /pmc/articles/PMC2972753/ /pubmed/15207032 http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0905.020388 Text en https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is a publication of the U.S. Government. This publication is in the public domain and is therefore without copyright. All text from this work may be reprinted freely. Use of these materials should be properly cited.
spellingShingle Perspective
Ashford, David A.
Kaiser, Robyn M.
Bales, Michael E.
Shutt, Kathleen
Patrawalla, Amee
McShan, Andre
Tappero, Jordan W.
Perkins, Bradley A.
Dannenberg, Andrew L.
Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
title Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
title_full Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
title_fullStr Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
title_full_unstemmed Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
title_short Planning against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations
title_sort planning against biological terrorism: lessons from outbreak investigations
topic Perspective
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2972753/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15207032
http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0905.020388
work_keys_str_mv AT ashforddavida planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT kaiserrobynm planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT balesmichaele planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT shuttkathleen planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT patrawallaamee planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT mcshanandre planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT tapperojordanw planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT perkinsbradleya planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations
AT dannenbergandrewl planningagainstbiologicalterrorismlessonsfromoutbreakinvestigations