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Persistency of Priors-Induced Bias in Decision Behavior and the fMRI Signal

It is well known that people take advantage of prior knowledge to bias decisions. To investigate this phenomenon behaviorally and in the brain, we acquired fMRI data while human subjects viewed ambiguous abstract shapes and decided whether a shape was of Category A (smoother) or B (bumpier). The dec...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Hansen, Kathleen A., Hillenbrand, Sarah F., Ungerleider, Leslie G.
Formato: Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Research Foundation 2011
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3058137/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21647208
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2011.00029
Descripción
Sumario:It is well known that people take advantage of prior knowledge to bias decisions. To investigate this phenomenon behaviorally and in the brain, we acquired fMRI data while human subjects viewed ambiguous abstract shapes and decided whether a shape was of Category A (smoother) or B (bumpier). The decision was made in the context of one of two prior knowledge cues, 80/20 and 50/50. The 80/20 cue indicated that upcoming shapes had an 80% probability of being of one category, e.g., B, and a 20% probability of being of the other. The 50/50 cue indicated that upcoming shapes had an equal probability of being of either category. The ideal observer would bias decisions in favor of the indicated alternative at 80/20 and show zero bias at 50/50. We found that subjects did bias their decisions in the predicted direction at 80/20 but did not show zero bias at 50/50. Instead, at 50/50 the subjects retained biases of the same sign as their 80/20 biases, though of diminished magnitude. The signature of a persistent though diminished bias at 50/50 was also evident in fMRI data from frontal and parietal regions previously implicated in decision-making. As a control, we acquired fMRI data from naïve subjects who experienced only the 50/50 stimulus distributions during both the pre-scan training and the fMRI experiment. The behavioral and fMRI data from the naïve subjects reflected decision biases closer to those of the ideal observer than those of the prior knowledge subjects at 50/50. The results indicate that practice making decisions in the context of non-equal prior probabilities biases decisions made later when prior probabilities are equal. This finding may be related to the “anchoring and adjustment” strategy described in the psychology, economics, and marketing literatures, in which subjects adjust a first approximation response – the “anchor” – based on additional information, typically applying insufficient adjustment relative to the ideal observer.