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Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition

Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experie...

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Autores principales: van Elk, Michiel, Slors, Marc, Bekkering, Harold
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Research Foundation 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3153838/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21833288
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00234
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author van Elk, Michiel
Slors, Marc
Bekkering, Harold
author_facet van Elk, Michiel
Slors, Marc
Bekkering, Harold
author_sort van Elk, Michiel
collection PubMed
description Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment.
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spelling pubmed-31538382011-08-10 Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition van Elk, Michiel Slors, Marc Bekkering, Harold Front Psychol Psychology Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. Frontiers Research Foundation 2010-12-27 /pmc/articles/PMC3153838/ /pubmed/21833288 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00234 Text en Copyright © 2010 van Elk, Slors and Bekkering. http://www.frontiersin.org/licenseagreement This is an open-access article subject to an exclusive license agreement between the authors and the Frontiers Research Foundation, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited.
spellingShingle Psychology
van Elk, Michiel
Slors, Marc
Bekkering, Harold
Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition
title Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition
title_full Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition
title_fullStr Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition
title_full_unstemmed Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition
title_short Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition
title_sort embodied language comprehension requires an enactivist paradigm of cognition
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3153838/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21833288
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00234
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